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TORT LIABILITY AND THE SCHOOLS
JOHN PHILLIP LINN*
About two thousand years ago, enterprising Romans discovered
that they could use mortar and stone to build a high and an almost
impregnable wall at relatively little cost. The significance of such
a structure in a time of high taxes became readily apparent. It
was simply less expensive to build a wall around a complex of
homes, stables, and granaries than it was to pay taxes. As an
added safeguard, a deep and wide ditch was dug around the outside
of the wall and filled with water When the tax collector's army
approached and demanded the payment of taxes, the men inside
would climb to the top of the wall and drop rocks on the soldiers
below until, battered and weary and without remaining supplies,
the tax collector and his army withdrew It must have been an
idealic life, - free, as it was, from taxation. The inhabitants behind
the wall could carry on their everyday functions of living and local
government oblivious to all that went on about them outside their
wall. Unfortunately, for those merry making tax evaders, the day
was to come when gunpowder was imported from the Orient and
the tax collector and his army, without having to advance far enough
to get their feet wet or have stones dropped upon them, effectively
demolished the wall.
Today, we are concerned with the protective walls of immunity
which stand as the great deterrent to tort litigation involving school
districts and their governing boards. These walls have often been
built upon judicial decisions applying the English medieval doc-
trine rex non potest peccare, "the kng can do no wrong." This
is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, generally applied to state
and federal governmental activities.1 It remains firmly standing
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.S. 1949, M.A. 1950,
New York University; LL.B. 1955, University of Denver.
1. Pnoss , Tors 125 (3d ed. 1964).
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in many of our states even though its application to school districts
has been denied throughout England for the past seventy-six years.
The immunity of local governmental units was not sovereign
immunity but found birth in the early English case, Russell v Men
of Devon.2 That Eighteenth century case arose when Russell
damaged his wagon while driving it over a bridge that was in
disrepair in the County of Devon. Russell sued the men dwelling
in the county who, it was alleged, had neglected their duty to keep
the bridge in passable condition. Relief was denied, however, be-
cause: (1) to grant relief would open a floodgate of litigation;
(2) there was no precedent to sustain such a cause of action; and
(3) there were no corporate funds from which a judgment could
be satisfied. Lord Kenyon, Chief Judge on the King's Bench, opined
that they could not be sued for any breach of duty they collectively
owed. In a separate opinion in the case, Judge Ashurst reasoned:
It is better that an individual should sustain an injury than
that the public should suffer an inconvenience. Now if this
action could be sustained, the public would suffer a great
inconvenience; for if the damages are recoverable against
the county, at all events they must be levied on one or two
individuals, who have no means whatever of reimbursing
themselves for if they were to bring separate actions against
each individual of the county for his proportion, it is better
that the plaintiff be without remedy 3
Although the issues in Russell v Men of Devon arose out of an
action against the people of an unincorporated community, the
reasoning of that case was adopted without discussion by an early
Massachusetts court in a case involving a quasi-corporation 4 and
so a concept of governmental immunity was raised as a protective
wall surrounding all political subdivisions.
Private institutions, as well as public institutions, found their
protective walls. In some cases, the courts applied the trust fund
theory to deny relief. According to this theory, monies collected
for the purpose of providing education must be held in trust for
that purpose alone; it was considered a misapplication of the trust
to deplete the "funds for education" in satisfaction of a judgment
for a claim founded in tort.
5
If legal scholars had had their way, the walls of immunity
would have been torn down long ago. They have been almost unani-
mous in their adamant criticism of the immunity doctrines.6 But,
2. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
3. Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. 362.
4. Mower v. The Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. Rep. 247 (1812).
5. Leviton v. Board of Education, 374 Ill. 594, 30 N.E.2d 536 (1940).
6. See PROSSER, TORTS 125 (3d ed. 1964), Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort,
34 YALE L. J. (1924) Fuller, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 -. Rv. L. REV. 437
(1941) Green, Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REv. 355 (1944) Harno, Tort
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until recently, the legal scholars, just as the armies of the early
tax collector, got little more than wet feet and stones dropped upon
their heads when they attacked the doctrines. Their arguments were
sometimes found in judicial opinions but the courts steadfastly re-
fused to accept the responsibility for effecting change. In effect,
the courts simply loaded the cannon of overrule with powder and
ball, aimed it at the immunity wall and then refused to fire the
destructive shot. That unpleasant task, it appeared, had to be left
to state legislatures.
The early attitude of the Supreme Court of Illinois was typical
in matters involving tort immunity 7 Until recently, Illinois school
districts realized the full protection of the immunity wall. When-
ever a claimant stood outside the wall and demanded recovery,
the school district had but to send its attorneys to the top of the
wall armed with boulders marked stare deciszs to drive the claimant
away
Then in a 1950 Illinois case," the court announced that while
the trust funds of a charitable institution were not available to
satisfy a judgment in a tort action, the charitable institution, by
the rule of respondeat superior, was responsive for the tortious
conduct of its agents and relief was available when liability insur-
ance existed. While the target of that judicial shot was not a public
school district, a similar shot did fall on the Broadlands Community
School District in Illinois two years later 9
The Broadlands School District had earlier purchased liability
insurance, even though no statutory authority existed for the pur-
chase of that insurance by a school district. In fact, the persuasive
case law of sister states indicated that such purchase by a school
district was an ultra vres act. Obviously, school districts have
only those powers specifically granted by statute or which may
necessarily be implied-and because public school districts clearly
enjoyed protection under the immunity doctrine, there wag no need
to purchase liability insurance. The school district, however, was
not permitted to plead its own illegal act of procuring liability
insurance as a defense. The court held that. "where liability in-
surance is available to protect the public funds, the reason for
the rule of immunity vanishes to the extent of the available in-
surance."10 The court found no justifiable reason for the immunity
of school districts based upon the mere fact that the school district
was created nolen volens by general law and, as such a quasi-
Immunity of Muntcipal Corporations, 4 IL. L. Q. 28 (1921) Pugh, Historical Approach to
the Doctrne of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953).
7. Elmore v. Drainage Comm'rs, 135 Ill. 269, 25 N.E. 1010 (1890).
S. Moore v. Mogle, 405 I1. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
9. Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School Dist., No. 201, 348 Ill. App.
567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1965).
10. Id., 109 N.E.2d at 641.
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corporation, was a part of the State of Illinois exercising a govern-
mental function. The court said that the only justifiable reason
for immunity of school districts from suit for tort is that it is
public policy to protect public funds and public property and to
prevent diversion of school funds to the payment of damage claims.1
The effect of its decision was not to abrogate immunity but to
allow school districts to waive as little or as much of the immunity
as they wished by the purchase of insurance. Subsequently Ill-
inois legislation authorized the purchase of some insurances by
school districts on a voluntary basis.12 A school district could how-
ever, go without insurance and rely on the protection of the im-
munity wall.
But, in 1959, the protective wall of immunity in Illinois was
reduced to rubble in the case of Molitor v Kaneland Community
Unit School District 3 which arose out of a school bus accident.
In its opinion, the court analyzed the theories supporting the im-
munity doctrine. It noted that the principles of Men of Devon
had not been applied to Illinois school districts until 1898,14 eight
years after English courts had refused to extend them to their
school districts. It construed several acts of the General Assembly
of Illinois as legislative dissatisfaction with the doctrines of sover-
eign immunity-the Workmen's Compensation and Occupational
Disease Act; 15 the Court of Claims Act,16 under which the state
itself is liable; the act imposing liability on cities and villages in
certain circumstances,' 7 and especially the legislatively authorized
insurance covering liability arising out of school bus accidents which
created a most pertinent anomaly After concluding that school
district immunity cannot be based on the sovereign immunity theory
or governmental theory, it turned to the protection of public funds
theory
In finding that the protection of public funds theory seems to
follow the line "that it is better for the individual to suffer than
for the public to be inconvenienced," '18 the court concluded that
in this day and age public education constitutes one of the biggest
businesses in the country and is as capable of satisfying judgments
based on the tortious conduct of its agents or servants as any
private business must do. Further, it appeared that the cost of
tort liability was a part of the cost of educational activities and
could and should be included and spread over the district in the
same way as other educational expenses. When public funds may
11. Id., 109 N.E.2d at 640.
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 129, 29-11a (Smith Hurd 1957).
l.-. 18 I1.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
14. Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 138.1, 172.36 (1957).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 439.1-439.24 (1957).
17. ILL. RLV. STAT. ch. 24, 1-13, 1-16 (1957).
iS. Moliter v. Kaneland Commrnunity Unit Dist. 302, 18 Il.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
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properly be expended to procure liability insurance as authorized
by statute, there is no reason to deny the propriety of spending
the funds to pay the liability itself in the absence of insurance.
To the school district's argument that abolition of the immunity
doctrine should be a function of the legislature and not the courts,
the court remarked that the doctrine had been established by the
courts and it was quite proper that it be abolished by the courts
without legislative help. When it was argued that a non-immunity
rule should be applied prospectively only, the court noted that such
a holding would deprive the plaintiff of the case before the court
of any benefit from his effort and expense in challenging an er-
roneous rule. It was recognized that completely retrospective ap-
plication of the non-immunity rule would place a hardship on
school districts who had relied on the doctrine of immunity Con-
sequently, the court limited its holding to those actions arising out
of the bus accident and subsequent cases. Nevertheless, the school
district had judgments totalling $850,000 rendered against it.19 It
was the judicial shot heard 'round the world of education.' School
districts feared that in their own states the wall might come
a-tumbling down. But what has happened since Molitor v Kane-
and?
In Illinois, the State General Assembly has set a statutory
limitation of $10,000 for each cause of action based in tort against
a school district and established a system of filing such a claim.20
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin followed Illinois' lead. In the
case of Holytz v City of Milwaukee,21 an action for personal m-
jury suffered by an infant on a city playground, the court said:
(W) e are now prepared to disavow those rulings of this court
which have created and preserved the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity from tort claims. . Upon careful con-
sideration we are of the opinion that it is appropriate to
abolish this immunity notwithstanding the legislature's fail-
ure to adopt corrective enactments. The case at bar
relates specifically to a city; however we consider that
abrogation applies (prospectively) to all public bodies within
the state: . . . school districts . . and other subdivisions
whether incorporated or not.22
Haney v City of Lexington,2 a 1964 Kentucky case involved
a municipal corporation. The court's holding in the case, which
abolished immunity from liability for the torts of muncipal corpor-
19. Molter v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. 302, 24 Ill.2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145
(1962) See also Nolte, Extraordinarj Care Lessena Vulnerability, AM. SCHOOL BD. J. 40
(June 1964).
20. "IL ANN. STAT. ch. 122, 821-31 (Smith Hurd 1961).
21. 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
22. Id. 115 N.W.2d at 625.
23. 386 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1964).
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ations and their agents, was specifically limited to municipal
corporations. The Kentucky court cited the Holytz case of Wiscon-
sin with approval but, unlike the Wisconsin court, did not extend
the holding to school districts. In one reported case dealing with
school district immunity since Haney, the Kentucky Supreme
Court affirmed a directed verdict for the school district because
the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of negligence,2
but the court said nothing concerning the doctrine of immunity
The clear implication is that the Kentucky court intends to wait
to determine the immunity question as applied to school districts
when it is squarely faced with such a case. The Kentucky court
may then abolish the rule concerning school districts, as happened
in Illinois, 25 or it may refuse to remove immunity, as happened in
Florida, 26 where the Florida court simply said that a school dis-
trict is "an arm or agency of the state" and inside the wall of
sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state.
In 1962, the Supreme Court of Minnesota removed the immunity
wall as it protected municipal corporations, school districts and
other sub-divisions of government as to claims arising out of in
jury "sustained after the next regular session of the Minnesota
Legislature. ' 27 Subsequently, the Legislature reinstated the doc-
trine as it applied to school districts, but the statute provides for
its own expiration in 1968.28
In Stone v Highway Comm'n,29 a case involving the claim for
wrongful death brought against the Arizona State Highway Com-
mission, the high court of Arizona declared that the reason for the
immunity rule no longer existed. Immunity was abolished not only
for the case before the court but for all such cases pending or
not yet filed, which were not barred by the statute of limitations,
including cases against the state under the theory of respondeat
superior School districts were not specifically referred to in the
Arizona court's opinion, but it is reasonable to conclude that school
districts in Arizona are no longer protected.
In two states, Iowa and Colorado, the wall of immunity stands
by only the slim majority of four-to-three decisions.2 0 The immunity
doctrine is criticized but then applied by the majority of the
court because it feels that if change is to come, it must come
from the legislature. A single change of mind or change of court
personnel might earlier cause the wall to fall. As a result, school
24. Bailey v. Gallitan County Bd., 383 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. 1964).
25. Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. 302, supra note 18.
26. Buck v. McLean, 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1959).
27. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962).
28. MINN. STAT. ANN. 466.02-466.10, 466.12 (Supp. 1965).
29. 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1964).
30. Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 138 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa 1965) Testone
v. School Dit. &E. 2, 152 Colo. 596. 384 P.2d 82 (1963).
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districts in these states, as in other states, are purchasing insur-
ance protection. What, however, is the effect of such insurance
protection?
Where the legislature has authorized the procurement of in-
surance, but has not expressly provided for waiver of immunity,
the courts have little difficulty in finding a waiver by implication
to the extent of the liability covered by insurance.3' Where the
school district has purchased insurance without statutory authority,
courts have inconsistently acted when faced with the question of
immunity waiver. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that pur-
chase of insurance did constitute an immunity waiver 32 The Ill-
inois court in the Broadlands case also considered the unauthorized
purchase of liability insurance an immunity waiver and later, in
Molitor, considered this a factor leading to the destruction of the
wall of immunity But a Federal District Court in Alaska, in dis-
cussing immunity, stated that purchase of insurance would not
constitute a waiver of immunity although the existence of insurance
was not pleaded m the case. 33 Michigan has refused to consider
the purchase of insurance as an immunity waiver 34 Similarly,
the Pennsylvania court held that the purchase of liability insurance
by a school district did not constitute a waiver of immunity 35
When it was argued that to deny valid waiver when insurance
exists is against public policy because the denial would deprive
the school district of the value of its purchase, the court -answered
that the insurance would protect the school district from the liabil-
ity of claims arising out of proprietary functions for which no
immunity exists.
One deterrent to the apparently unauthorized purchase of in-
surance protection is the possible court action that might be brought
against individual school board members for the cost of such in-
surance. The argument of the Pennsylvania court-that the school
district still needs insurance to protect against liability for claims
arising out of proprietary functions-if not for claims arising out
of governmental functions-would seem to raise a very -valid de-
fense against such court actions.
There is also the possibility that a school district might be
subject to an action for damages, as well as a suit for injunctive
relief, where it maintains a nuisance. William Prosser, after draw-
ing from many sources,36 concluded that "(a nuisance) has meant
31. E.g., Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26 C, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1960).
32. Rogers V. Butler, 170 Tenn. 126, 92 S.W.2d 414 (1935).
33. Tapscott V. Page, 17 Alaska 507 (D. 1958).
34. Sayer v. School Dist. No. 1, Fractional, 366"Mich. 217, 114 N.W.2d 191 (1962).
35. Supler v. School Dist., 407 Pa. 657, 182 A.2d 535 (1962).
36. BISHOP, NoN-CONTRAC'r LAw 411 n.1 (1889). Smith, Torts Without Particular Name.s,
69 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1921) Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 6 Phil. Pa. 82 (1865) Carroll v.
New York Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N.Y.S. 653 (1926).
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all things to all men, and has been applied indiscriminately, to
everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked
in a pie." 7 Generally, a nuisance has been said to arise out of
conduct that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment
of the land of another, but this is not a necessary limitation. The
Kansas Supreme Court, which recognizes the immunity doctrine,
allowed recovery against a municipality for the wrongful death of
an infant who had walked upon the accumulated crust of an
abandoned city dump, fell through, and drowned.38 The court said
that government ownership does not establish a right to maintain
a nuisance. Michigan has denied recovery in an action, based on
nuisance, to recover damages for wrongful death arising out of a
playground accident. 39 That court reasoned that the harm com-
plained of was not an interference with the use of land-therefore
the plaintiff could not recover Virginia has said that even though
personal injury results from a nuisance maintained by the school
district, recovery is denied on the ground that the school district
is an "arm or agency" of the state and is immune from liability
in the performance of a governmental function. 40 Ohio and Ten-
nessee,41 states which have held fast to the doctrine of immunity,
have simply enjoined the maintenance of nuisances by school dis-
tricts because of the unreasonable interference with the use of
the land.
Just as the concept of nuisance may be used to cause a chink
in the immunity wall, so may the concept of trespass. Trespass,
as the name implies, operates to afford relief when the govern-
mental entity, in the performance of a lawful function, trespasses
on the land or person of another causing damage or injury Mich-
igan has granted relief in a slip and fall case resulting from the
wrongful construction of a school building in such a manner that
water flowed across thp public sidewalk and caused a dangerous
icy condition.4 2 The Michigan court said this was a cause of
action to which the defense of governmental immunity may not
be interposed. The court held that this case fell within the doc-
trine of an earlier case in which it was said that "where the injury
is the result of a direct act or trespass of the municipality, it is
liable, no matter whether acting in a public or private capac-
ity Y)43
Plaintiff's attorneys can be expected to try their cases, at least
37. PROSSER, TORTS 87 (3d ed. 1964).
38. Lehmkulk v. City of Junction City, 179 Kan. 389, 295 P.2d 621 (1956).
39. Williams v. Primary School Dist. No. 3, 3 Mich. App. 468, 142 N.W.2d 894 (1966).
40. Kellams v. School Bd., 220 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96 (1960).
41. Wyman v. Board of Educ., 6 Ohio App.2d 94, 216 N.E.2d 637 (1964), Jones v.
Knox County, 327 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1959).
42. Pound v, School Dist., 372 Mich. 499, 127 N.W.2d 390 (1964).
43. Ferris v. Board of Educ., 122 Mich. 315, 81 N.W 98 (1899).
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in part, on nuisance or trespass whenever the facts permit because
these appear as areas of weakness in the immunity wall.
Plaintiff's attorneys can be expected to focus attention on the
anomalies created by state legislatures who promulgate "half way"
laws which expose school districts to liability in some instances,
which destroy the immunity wall on one side only, or leave the
decision to destroy a part of the wall to the school district itself.
Immunity no longer extends to school districts in many states
for liability arising out of bus accidents. Some state statutes re-
quire the school district or state agency to procure liability insur-
ance before operating a school bus. Other state legislatures have
simply authorized the purchase of insurance. Mississippi has
waived immunity from tort for actions arising out of the operation
of school buses up to $5,000 per person and $50,000 per accident,
4
4
but unlike other states, Mississippi does not authorize the purchase
of insurance. Each school district in Mississippi is required to
contribute $10 per year for each bus it operates to the state Ac-
cident Contingent Fund. If the fund should prove insufficient to
satisfy a judgment, tax funds will be used to cover the shortage.
A few states have recognized the responsibility of school dis-
tricts for the liability of its agents or servants through the estab-
lishment of "save-harmless" laws. New York,
45 New Jersey,' 6
Connecticut, 47 and Massachusetts48 have such statutes. In Wyom-
ing, 9 and Oregon5" the school district may assume the liability of
agents and servants arising out of the negligent performance of
duties within the scope and authority of their employment.
The "save-harmless" laws, whether mandatory or discretionary,
are of tremendous importance to school district employees who
have never enjoyed the protective wall of immunity As teachers
become more active in their demands made collectively through
their organizations, it is likely that more states will enact "save-
harmless laws." But the point to be stressed here is the legis-
lative recognition that the school district should respond in damages
for the torts of its servants under the same doctrine of respondeat
superior that applies to private employers outside the wall of
immunity Such limited liability affords additional protection to the
injured person where there is negligent conduct or negligent super-
vision but it leaves the innocent injured person without relief
where the injury occurs because of inadequate supervision. A very
large percentage of the tort cases involving school districts as
44. Miss. CODN ANN. 3.996(101) to -. 996.(115) (supp. 1965).
45. N.Y. EDuc. LAW 2023, 2560.
46. N.J. REV. STAT. 18:5-50.4 (Supp. 1964).
47. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 10-235 (Supp. 1965).
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, 100 C (Supp. 1964).
49. WYo. STAT. ANN. 21- 158 (1957),
50. OE. RV. STAT. 243.610 (1965),
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reported from those jurisdictionssl where immunity has been re-
moved by legislative act, are founded on inadequate supervision-
the failure to assign sufficient personnel to provide the necessary
supervisory duties.
Courts continue to .narrowly construe "save-harmless" statutes
on the ground that they are in derogation of the common law 32
Similarly, "safe place" statutes, requiring the safe construction and
maintenance of buildings, are narrowly construed to prohibit re-
covery in suits against school districts.
58
In analyzing the status of the law of school district immunity
since Molitor v Kaneland, one cannot help but question the logic
of a body of law that permits a child to recover for a broken arm
suffered in a school bus accident but denies recovery when an
innocent student suffers loss of speech, permanent brain damage
and paralysis on the school grounds. 54
No American court has recently given whole-hearted support
to the doctrine of immunity Many courts condemn the doctrine or
the reasoning supporting it, but almost all courts are still willing
to dismiss the problem with the suggestion that its resolution lies
solely with the legislature. One may discern a persistent effort
to negate the immunity doctrine; yet it is a nibbling process.
State legislatures move in a halting and hesitating manner away
from the immunity concept by authorizing school districts to pur-
chase some indemnity or liability insurance. But there is no frontal
assault that will bring about full scale destruction of the immunity
walls. Consequently school districts go about their business, behind
their protective walls, secure in the realization that unless social,
economic or political pressures produce a gunpowder more des-
tructive than that produced thus far by legal logic there is little
to fear.
51. New York, California, Washington, Hawaii, Nevada and Utah have to some extent
abrogated the immunity doctrine: N.Y. EDUC. 3813 N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. 50e,h,i,3a, CAt.
GOVT CODE 815-996.6 WASH. RsV. CODE 28.58.030 (1961), HAWAii REV. LAw 37-1 & 2,
38-4 to 9.5, 245A (Supp. 1961), NEV. REV. STAT. 41.031 to .038 (Supp. 1965), and UTAH
CODE A ,. 63-30-1 to 34 (Supp. 1965).
52. See Boucher v. Fuhlbruck, 213 .A.2d 455 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965).
53. See Niedfelt v. Joint School Dist No. 1, 23 Wls.2d 641, 127 N.W.2d 800 (1964).
54. Koehn v. Board of Educ., 193 Kan. 263, 892 P.2d 949 (1964).
